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REVISING THE FAA TO PERMIT
EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS
Sarah Rudolph Cole*
I presume that the symposium organizers decided to have a symposium
rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) at least in part because they
believe, as I do, that the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act is woefully out of date.
Written in a very different time, the FAA, as currently interpreted, enables easy
enforcement of parties’ agreements to arbitrate.  Yet the FAA drafters failed to
anticipate the creativity of parties interested in using arbitration or the changes
in economic relations that would prompt such creativity.  As a result of this
quite understandable failure, courts have had to address a variety of difficult
questions including whether party requests for non-traditional treatment of their
arbitration awards should be enforced.  Not surprisingly, courts responded to
party requests in different ways, resulting in a circuit split on the question of
whether parties may agree to expand judicial review of arbitration awards.
Although I suspect that the current United States Supreme Court will decide
this issue in favor of permitting parties to expand judicial review of arbitration
awards on the principle that the FAA is pro-party autonomy,1 I nevertheless
think that a legislative solution to the problem would be more efficacious.  In
addition, addressing the expanded judicial review issue would enable Congress
to revisit other problems with the FAA’s judicial review provision, many of
which will be pointed out in this Article and have already been discussed in
Arbitration Law in America:  A Critical Assessment.2
This Article, which builds on previous work I have undertaken in this
area,3 ultimately recommends that Congress amend the FAA to permit parties
to agree to expanded judicial review, so long as the court’s review of the award
does not compromise the institutional integrity of the courts.  Part I of the Arti-
* Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The
Ohio State University.  This Article benefited from the comments of Stephen J. Ware and
Edward Brunet as well as the participants at the “Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act:  An
Examination of Whether and How the Act Should Be Amended” Symposium held January
26, 2007.
1 The Court intends to provide an answer to this question during the next term.  The Court
has granted certiorari in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476 (9th Cir.
2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2875 (2007).  The question in Hall Street is whether a court
should enforce a post-dispute agreement to review an arbitration award for legal errors or to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the arbitrator’s factual findings.
2 EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBI-
TRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) [hereinafter ARBITRATION LAW
IN AMERICA].
3 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants?  The Overlooked Problem of Party Auton-
omy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000).
214
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ109.txt unknown Seq: 2 16-JAN-08 15:05
Fall 2007] REVISING THE FAA 215
cle will examine the growing phenomenon of increased judicial review provi-
sions in commercial entities’ arbitration agreements.  Part II will look at
increased judicial review provisions from the courts’ perspective—breaking
down existing case law into the three approaches courts use to address this
problem.  Part II ultimately concludes that none of these approaches is satisfac-
tory because all rely to some degree or another on interpretations of the 1925
Federal Arbitration Act.  Because the Act’s drafters never imagined that parties
would want greater review of arbitration awards than the FAA provides, the
FAA does little to answer the problem.  Part III considers possible interpreta-
tions of the FAA judicial review section (section 10(a)) and concludes that, on
balance, an approach that treats the FAA as a set of default rules is more con-
sistent with the FAA’s legislative purpose than is an approach that treats sec-
tion 10 as a mandatory provision that parties may not avoid.  Finally, Part IV
articulates a test that could be incorporated into the FAA to help resolve this
problem while also limiting, albeit in a small way, parties’ freedom to agree to
whatever kind of judicial review provisions they want.
I. THE GROWTH IN AGREEMENTS TO EXPAND JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
Commercial entities have become interested in greater judicialization of
arbitration relatively recently.4  By this, I mean that they are including in their
arbitration agreements provisions that expand judicial review beyond the limits
outlined in FAA section 10(a).5  Why commercial entities are doing this is
4 See W. Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1992) (parties
agree to permit arbitrator to make findings of fact and conclusions of law); Edward Brunet,
The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 3, 6
(“There is evidence that sophisticated, repeat users of arbitration are willing to pay higher
transaction costs for a more complicated and judicialized style of arbitration.”).  Brunet sug-
gests that the National Arbitration Forum’s (“NAF”) increased prominence as an arbitral
service provider is evidence that supports this theory. Id.  Unlike other providers, NAF
advertises and requires that its arbitrators follow the law. Id. (citing A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at
20) (NAF procedural code advertised to mandate that arbitrators follow the law when render-
ing decisions); see also Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (1996).  Brunet notes elsewhere that companies are more
interested in ensuring that an arbitrator correctly applies the law in order to “reduce the risk
of an arbitrator deciding the case ‘equitably’ or arbitrarily.” EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES
B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 427
(1997).
5 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) lists four bases upon which a party may challenge an arbitral award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
See also P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005)
(contract provides judicial error as basis for review); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache
Trade Servs., Inc. (Kyocera II), 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261,
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unclear.  Perhaps merchants’ interest in expanding judicial review of arbitra-
tors’ decisions is a response to society’s increased skepticism of arbitration.6
Or, it may be that merchants no longer have simple commercial disputes that an
arbitrator who is primarily an expert in industry customs can decide.7  Today,
merchants may have purely commercial or purely legal disputes, or a combina-
tion of both.  If legal questions are at issue, merchants may wish to expand
judicial review of arbitration awards because arbitrators are generally consid-
ered experts in particular industries but not in the law.  In other words,
merchants might want to increase the predictability of results where legal issues
are pending while still taking advantage of some of arbitration’s benefits, such
as speed and efficiency.
Yet under the current system of review articulated in FAA section 10(a),
parties do not have the power to cabin arbitrator discretion in any meaningful
way.  Under section 10(a), a court may reverse an arbitral award only under
1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (pointing out that parties agreed that arbi-
tration decision would be reviewed for “errors of law”); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 14 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that parties agree to judicial
review of arbitral award under “arbitrary and capricious” standard); New England Utils. v.
Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D. Mass. 1998) (stating that parties agreed to judicial
review of arbitral award for errors of law); S. Wash. Assocs. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217, 219
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (pointing out that parties agree to same standard of review as is used
to review findings of fact and conclusions of law by a Colorado District Court).
6 Society has grown increasingly suspicious of arbitration as a means for resolving disputes,
at least under certain circumstances.  Mandatory binding arbitration, particularly of statutory
claims, has caused increasing controversy.  Much attention has been focused on whether the
existing arbitral procedures provide sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that parties
will be able to vindicate their statutory rights effectively. See, e.g., Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 105, at D-34 (June 3, 1994); EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 132, at E-4 (July 10, 1997).  Self-regulatory organizations like the NASD and
NYSE responded to criticisms of their mandatory arbitration systems by amending their
rules to eliminate the requirement that “associated persons” trading on their exchanges had
to agree to arbitrate all statutory disputes arising out of their employment. See BUREAU OF
NAT’L AFFAIRS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT (Sept. 16, 1998).  Of course,
employers in the securities industry may still require their employees to agree to arbitrate
statutory claims as a condition of employment. Id.  Bills have also been introduced in Con-
gress to ensure that pre-dispute arbitration agreements of employment discrimination claims
would no longer be permissible. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. 63,
105th Cong. (1997).
7 See CPR COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS
BEST:  SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 288 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter
H. Kaskell eds., 2001) (stating that changes in corporate philosophy, bad arbitration exper-
iences and/or high stakes may lead a party to seek greater judicial review of arbitration
awards); David Rudenstine, The Impact on the Arbitration Process of Arbitrating Statutory
Claims, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:  PROCEEDINGS OF
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 46TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR § 10.6.1, at 260
(Bruno Stein ed., 1994) (stating that as the kinds of issues submitted to arbitrators become
more complex, parties’ arbitrator selection process may be affected because knowledge of
industry norms will no longer be sufficient to justify selection of an arbitrator).
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very limited circumstances.8  Limited review was initially perceived as a bene-
fit of the arbitral process, enhancing decision-making efficiency as well as
insuring that the arbitrator, often an expert in the subject matter of the dispute,
was able to render a final decision that a judge, who is ignorant of industry
customs, would not disturb.9  Today, arbitrators often are not considered
experts in the subject matter of the dispute they arbitrate because many disputes
involve statutory and legal claims rather than claims that can be resolved by
examining industry customs.10  Moreover, parties are more concerned about
arbitrator bias as the subject matter of the disputes submitted to arbitration has
changed.11  In addition, parties to modern arbitration often have widely dispa-
rate levels of experience with the arbitral process.  An institutional party, who
chooses arbitration to resolve all disputes, may have an advantage over the
party who may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only because his con-
tract with the institutional party requires him to do so.12  In this situation, the
institutional party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, creat-
ing an incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.  The “one-shot” party will
not have an opportunity to develop similar relations.  Thus, realistic concerns
about arbitrator bias arise.13  Moreover, one-shot players, unlike repeat players,
8 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  In addition to the four statutory grounds set out in section 10(a), many
of the federal appeals courts permit challenge to an arbitral award based on one or more of
the following grounds:  manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator; the award is arbitrary
and capricious; the award violates a clear public policy; the award fails to draw its essence
from the parties’ contract; and the award is completely irrational. See Stephen L. Hayford, A
New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:  Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned
Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 450-51 (1998)
(citing federal appeals court cases).
9 Viewed this way, the reluctance of judges to revisit arbitral decisions is not unlike the
deference awarded to corporate directors under the business judgment rule. See LEWIS D.
SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ, JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & ELLIOT J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS
LAW AND POLICY:  MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 40 (4th ed. 1998).  The common notion
underlying each is that a judge should hesitate to substitute his judgment for that of a person
more qualified either by expertise or by the fact that the parties chose the alternate decision
maker.  Similar notions underlie the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which cautions
against judicial intervention into agency decisions about statutory meaning. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
10 A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at E-11 (May 11, 1995).
11 See Hugh R. McCombs & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Courts Examine Whether Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards Can Be Expanded by Contract and Whether Federal Agencies Can
Agree to Binding Arbitration, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at B5 (stating that in securities and
franchise cases, customers or franchisees may question the impartiality of the industry arbi-
trators); EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, supra note 6.
12 An individual who has few opportunities to negotiate agreements or litigate claims is a
“one-shot” player.  Unlike the repeat player, the one-shot player is characterized by a lack of
organization and sophistication about negotiating contracts or engaging in private dispute
resolution. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against Enforce-
ment of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC
L. REV. 449, 452 (1996).
13 See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, supra note 6 (stating that mandatory arbitration
systems are inherently biased against discrimination plaintiffs because the employer obtains
a structural advantage as a repeat player against the plaintiff, who is a one-shot player).
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care about errors even if those errors are unbiased.  Because they will not par-
ticipate in arbitration multiple times, error costs will not even out over time.
Thus, if a one-shot player is risk-averse, it will prefer to avoid the uncertainty
inherent in arbitration and prefer a regime that allows more invasive judicial
review.
As a result, many parties now believe that the limited review outlined in
FAA section 10(a) creates a risk of arbitrary and capricious, or even biased,
decision making.  Groups interested in reform of the arbitral process often
advocate the requirements of written opinions and expanded judicial review of
those opinions as means to achieve the fairness they believe is currently miss-
ing from the process.14  This concern, together with the expansion in the kind
of disputes that may be submitted to arbitration, may have triggered an increase
in parties’ desires for more predictability in outcomes that expansive judicial
review may achieve.
Still another possibility exists.  As commercial transactions grow in size
and amount, the disputes that arise from those transactions similarly increase in
magnitude.  Under the single-tier system of traditional arbitration, parties were
not concerned about any single result because results would even out over time
(i.e., parties were risk-neutral).15  As the stakes in a given case become higher,
however, merchants who might be risk-neutral with respect to small disputes
may become risk-averse and want more predictable results.16  Thus, the parties’
desire to expand judicial review may simply be seen as a way to constrain the
uncertainty inherent in a single-tier or limited multi-tier system.
Although there may be good reasons underlying parties’ desires to expand
judicial review, such agreements are controversial because they demand greater
judicial oversight of arbitration than Congress currently provides.  Because this
Symposium asks us to rethink the FAA, I propose to revise the existing FAA
judicial review section to implement a test I developed in a previous article17—
rather than simply reject agreements to expand judicial review, FAA section 10
should be revised to explicitly permit parties to expand judicial review of arbi-
tral awards.  The review should not be unlimited however.  Expansion of judi-
cial review should only be permissible if the parties’ proposed alterations of the
standard of review do not threaten the institutional integrity of the courts.
Before the new test is proposed, however, I will review the existing case law to
better illustrate the current problem.
14 See Cole, supra note 3; A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statu-
tory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, supra note 10.  Others are con-
cerned that expanding judicial review will dramatically undermine the efficiency of the
arbitration process and increase arbitration’s costs, making the process less attractive to pro-
spective users. CPR COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 289.
15 This conclusion assumes unbiased errors in the decision-making process.  So long as
arbitral errors are unbiased, parties have no cause for alarm over any single decision. See
Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 922-23
(1979).
16 CPR COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 288.
17 Cole, supra note 3.
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II. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF PARTIES’ ABILITY TO OBTAIN ENFORCEMENT OF
CONTRACTS FOR EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
Three different approaches emerge from the case law analyzing parties’
ability to agree to expand judicial review of arbitral awards.  First, some courts
conclude that parties can agree to expanded federal court review of an arbitra-
tion award.18  A second approach, which Judge Kozinski advanced in his origi-
nal Kyocera I concurrence, is a modified freedom of contract approach,
permitting parties to expand judicial review of arbitration awards if the court is
familiar with the standard of review.19  A third approach prohibits parties from
obtaining enforcement of agreements to expand judicial review.
A. Enforcing Parties’ Standards
The first approach takes a broad view of federal jurisdiction.  Courts fol-
lowing this approach allow parties to contract for whatever standard of judicial
review they desire.  In these cases, courts acknowledge no limitations on the
parties’ ability to ask for, or the court’s ability to grant, standards of review
different from those listed in the FAA.  The courts following this approach
require that party requests be made using clear contractual language.20  For
example, in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,21
the parties contracted for federal court review of any arbitral decisions rendered
in disputes between them on the basis of “errors of law.”22  The Fifth Circuit
held that the parties could agree to expand federal judicial review of their arbi-
tration award.23  The Gateway court emphasized that the FAA’s judicial review
provision was a default rule that parties could contractually avoid.24  Because
the court viewed FAA section 10(a) as providing default rules that could be
altered by contract, it did not consider whether agreeing to expanded judicial
review caused any jurisdictional problems for the federal court required to con-
duct the review.
18 See Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook. 254 F.3d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (The parties agreed
to have an award reviewed using same standard “as that applied by an appellate court
reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.”); see also P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S.
Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257
F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th
Cir. 1995); Kristen M. Blankley, Be More Specific!  Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration
Agreement Expand Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL
CIRCUIT REV. 391 (2006) (discussing cases).
19 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (Kyocera I), 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozin-
ski, J., concurring).
20 See Richard E. Speidel, Parties’ Power to Vary Standards for Review of International
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 314, 315 n.6 (2007).
21 Gateway, 64 F.3d 993.
22 Id. at 996.
23 Ignoring the parties’ agreement, the district court had reviewed the arbitral award using a
“harmless error” standard rather than the “errors of law” standard the parties selected. Id. at
997.  In addition to holding that the parties could choose their own standard of review, the
court also held that a court should apply the standard of review the parties selected. Id.
24 Id. at 996-97.
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B. Using Familiar Standards
Judge Kozinski took a more limited approach to this question in Kyocera
I, concurring in a decision to permit parties to contract for judicial review of
arbitral decisions on the basis of errors of law.25  Although the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed Kyocera I,26 the Kozinski concurrence influenced
many commentators and court decisions on this issue between 1998 and
2007.27  As a result, the concurrence is still worth examining.
In his concurrence, Judge Kozinski articulated his concern that the cases
allowing parties to decide how their arbitration should be administered did not
naturally support a conclusion that the parties can dictate how the courts should
review the decision.  Judge Kozinski stated, “I do not believe parties may
impose on the federal courts burdens and functions that Congress has with-
held.”28  Responding to this concern, he reached the same conclusion as the
majority, reasoning that any case where parties agreed to expand judicial
review could have been in federal court absent the existence of the arbitration
agreement.  Thus, Judge Kozinski concluded, “enforcing the arbitration agree-
ment—even with enhanced judicial review—will consume far fewer judicial
resources than if the case were given plenary adjudication.”29
25 The Kyocera agreement provided in full:  “The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any
award:  (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii)
where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii)
where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.”  LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp. (Kyocera I), 130 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1997).
26 Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., Inc. (Kyocera II), 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
27 See New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64 (D. Mass. 1998);
Trombetta v. Niren, GD 04-015418 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny County 2005), printed in 153
PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 167 (2005); Cole, supra note 3; Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell
Courts What to Do?  Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV.
429, 429 n.6, 442 n.81 (2004);  Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 248 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-in” for Judicial Review of
Errors of Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 266-
67 (1997).
28 Kyocera I, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
29 Id.  Several state courts have also considered the propriety of allowing parties to contract
to expand judicial review of arbitral awards.  At least three courts prohibit party enlargement
of statutory standards. See S. Wash. Assocs. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217, 219 (Colo. Ct. App.
1992); Chi. Southshore & S. Bend R.R. v. N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 682 N.E.2d 156,
159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich Ct. App. 1995).  Four
other courts permit parties to expand the standard of review. See Moncharsh v. Heily &
Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. 1992); Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631,
634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 640 A.2d 788, 793
(N.J. 1994); NAB Constr. Corp. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 579 N.Y.S.2d 375, 375 (App. Div.
1992).  Like the federal courts, state courts disagree on this issue.  A Michigan appellate
court found that because a state statute did not authorize the parties to appeal substantive
matters following an arbitration, a clause in the parties’ contract authorizing an appeal on the
ground that the arbitrator made an “[error] of substance” was not enforceable. Dick, 534
N.W.2d at 187, 191. Similarly, in South Washington Associates, 859 P.2d at 220, a Colorado
appellate court held that parties cannot define by contract the power of a court of law.
According to the court, the parties’ agreement to authorize appellate court review using the
same standard as the court would use to review a trial court decision was invalid because the
authority to determine jurisdiction of a state appellate court belongs to the legislature rather
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Kozinski was also concerned that the work the district court would per-
form when reviewing an arbitral award was different from the approach it
would use if the case had been brought in the court originally.  Kozinski ulti-
mately concluded that Kyocera’s arbitration agreement should be enforced as
written because the different work Kyocera and LaPine requested was identical
to that performed by a district court reviewing administrative agency or bank-
ruptcy court decisions.  Kozinski speculated that the answer would be different
if the parties had selected an unfamiliar standard of review, such as flipping a
coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.30
C. Prohibiting Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate
Three circuits, the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth, reject parties’ attempts to
agree to expand judicial review of arbitration awards.31  The courts in these
circuits take a very narrow view of federal jurisdiction.  Rejecting a union’s
suggestion that the court should set aside the arbitrator’s award if it was an
“unreasonable interpretation of the contract,”32 the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Sun-Times held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to review cases
beyond the limits identified in FAA section 10(a).  According to the court,
while parties are free to contract for all the private justice they might wish, they
cannot contract for judicial review of arbitral awards.  In other words, the court
stated, “[F]ederal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”33
than the parties. Id.  Interpreting the statute granting it jurisdiction, the court rejected the
claim that the “award” of a panel of arbitrators fell within the category of “final judgments”
that the legislature authorized the court to hear. Id. at 219-20.  More generally, the court
stated, while parties have the freedom to formulate the arbitral process, the power to “define
and prescribe the powers of a court of law” belongs to the legislature alone. Id. at 220.
By contrast, a New York appellate court enforced a parties’ agreement to allow judicial
review to determine if an arbitral award was arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as
to evidence bad faith. See NAB Constr. Corp., 579 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
30 Kyocera I, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
31 See Kyocera II, 341 F.3d 987; Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir.
2001); Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1991).  The Eighth Circuit, while failing to enforce any party agreements to expand judicial
review, seems to be more open to the possibility.  In UHC Management Co. v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998), the court, in dicta, expressed reservations
about the parties’ ability to agree to expand judicial review.  Recognizing that there is a
difference between contracting for arbitral procedures and contracting for an Article III court
to review an arbitral decision, the court identified the issue as an “interesting question” of
which a resolution was unnecessary. Id. at 998.  In a subsequent decision, Schoch v.
InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit reiterated its skepticism
about parties’ ability to expand judicial review but appeared more open to the notion of
broader judicial review, stating that parties may be able to enforce expanded judicial review
provisions if they “clearly and unmistakably” indicate an “intent to have the district court
review de novo the arbitrator’s award.”
32 Chi. Sun-Times, 935 F.2d at 1507.
33 Id. at 1505.  The Seventh Circuit, in IDS Life Insurance Co. v. Royal Alliance Associates,
266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001), followed the Chicago Sun-Times holding, finding that a
plaintiff could attack an arbitration award only on those grounds identified in the FAA.  In
IDS, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, securities broker-dealers, tortiously interfered
with some of the plaintiffs’ employees’ contracts. Id. at 648.  Affirming the district court’s
decision to enforce the arbitration award, the Seventh Circuit stated that “the grounds for
challenging an arbitration award are narrowly limited . . . .  Within exceedingly broad limits,
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The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in Kyocera II, reached the same conclu-
sion.  The court stated that Congress clearly demarcated the limits of judicial
review when it enacted the FAA.  According to the court, the FAA “afford[s]
an extremely limited review authority . . . [that does not] permit unnecessary
public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”34  While parties may agree
to have appellate arbitral panels review arbitration decisions, once in the federal
court system, the private arbitration process is over and the parties can play no
role in instructing a federal court as to how a dispute may be resolved.35  Any
other conclusion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized, would allow parties to create
federal jurisdiction by contract.36
In sum, a review of the existing case law reveals disagreement about the
appropriate method for evaluating parties’ agreements to expand judicial
review of arbitral awards.  The Gateway approach represents a freedom of con-
tract approach—contracts should be honored without regard to questions of
limitations on jurisdiction.  A second approach, which Kozinski articulates in
Kyocera I, suggests a compromise—allow parties to contract for standards of
review as long as the court is familiar with them.  Since the cases could have
been in federal court in the absence of the parties’ arbitration agreement, rea-
sons Kozinski, enforcement of familiar standards of review will be efficient and
will not violate any important federal jurisdictional principles.  A third
approach, represented by the Chicago Sun-Times case, goes the other direction,
prohibiting parties from agreeing to any standard of review not identified in the
FAA.
III. WHY THE FAA, AS DRAFTED, FAILS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE
The central issue in each of the cases evaluating party requests for
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards, not explicitly addressed in any of
them, is whether the FAA’s limitations on judicial review are mandatory or
default rules.37  In evaluating any novel request for judicial action, the court
must first establish that it has statutory authority to grant the request.  If FAA
section 10(a) establishes a mandatory rule, the parties’ agreement to expand
judicial review beyond section 10(a) must be rejected because the court does
the parties to an arbitration agreement choose their method of dispute resolution and are
bound by it however bad their choice appears to be either ex ante or ex post.” Id. at 649.
34 Kyocera II, 341 F.3d at 998.
35 Id. at 1000.  According to the court, “a federal court may only review an arbitral decision
on the grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.  Private parties have no power to alter
or expand those grounds, and any contractual provision purporting to do so is, accordingly,
legally unenforceable.” Id.
36 Id. at 999 (citing Chi. Sun-Times, 935 F.2d at 1504-05).
37 Default rules are those statutory and common law principles that govern party behavior
unless parties by contract opt out of them. ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at
112-13; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1999).  Mandatory rules are legislatively created
obligations that parties cannot contract around. Id.  Professor Brunet notes that the split over
how to treat agreements to expand judicial review of arbitration awards is an excellent illus-
tration of the “dichotomy” between default and mandatory rules.  Edward Brunet, The
Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration System:  Choice and Preemption,
in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 63, 80.
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not have the power to enforce it.  If section 10(a) is a default rule, then the
court has the authority to enforce the agreement if the agreement does not oth-
erwise require the court to engage in arbitrary and capricious decision making.
The principal objective of this section of the Article is to determine whether the
FAA limits the judicial review of arbitral awards to the reasons section 10(a)
identifies or whether the FAA simply provides a default rule to govern situa-
tions where parties do not request more judicial involvement than the existing
statute authorizes.
The presumption should be in favor of achieving the social policy objec-
tives of the FAA with default rules if possible because default rules better pre-
serve the concept of freedom of contract by allowing parties to opt out of them
in favor of a regime they prefer.38  Moreover, unlike a mandatory rule, a
default rule limits the potential loss that may result to “the lesser of two
amounts:  (1) the cost to parties of contracting back to their desired rule and (2)
the cost to parties of living with an undesirable default.”39  If it is determined
that the FAA’s judicial review provision is a mandatory rule, by contrast, the
potential loss that could result is always the latter, which imposes significant
costs on parties who otherwise would have negotiated around the rule.
The Gateway court must have concluded that the FAA’s rules are default
rules rather than mandatory terms because its decision allowed parties to con-
tract around FAA section 10(a).40  To determine whether section 10(a) is a
mandatory rule or a default allocation around which parties can contract is a
question that should be answered, if possible, primarily by examining the
FAA’s language and the congressional intent underlying the drafting of that
language.
The standard textualist approach to statutory interpretation assumes that
the goal of statutory analysis is to give effect to the expressed intent of Con-
38 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989); Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Con-
tracts:  The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 733 (1993); J.
Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 869.  The presumption that default
rules are preferable to mandatory rules may be incorrect if there is reason to suspect the
validity of parties’ choices.  In such a situation, a mandatory rule would be preferable to
avoid these mistakes.  For example, I have argued elsewhere that employees should not be
bound to pre-dispute arbitration agreements that they sign as a condition of employment
because they have disparate negotiation incentives (when compared to the employer) and
because they systematically underestimate the significance of the provision that they sign.
See Cole, supra note 12.  In the cases where parties agree to expand judicial review of
arbitral awards, there is little reason to suspect the validity of the parties’ choices because the
parties are both repeat players with significant experience in negotiating such agreements.
39 Verkerke, supra note 38, at 869.
40 Another possibility exists.  Professor Alan Rau suggests that the expanded judicial review
question could be treated as an arbitrability question that does not implicate the FAA at all.
Alan Scott Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review:  A Brief Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB. 159
(2002).  According to Professor Rau, parties should be able to tailor the arbitration process
as they wish.  Thus, parties should be able to expand judicial review or, for that matter,
withhold legal issues from arbitrators entirely because parties can always limit the scope of
arbitral issues. Id. at 160-61.
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gress.41  To determine what Congress intended, this analysis traditionally starts
and ends with the “plain language of the statute.”42  Difficulties arise when the
statutory language is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the inter-
pretive question but the statutory language fails to address it.  In such situa-
tions, courts tend to examine not only the statutory language, but its context
and the statute’s structure as well.43  If that examination fails to provide suffi-
cient illumination, courts often resort to the examination of legislative his-
tory.44  While Congress has not endorsed this method of analysis as a means
for elucidating statutory meaning, the idea that the analysis should focus on the
text, its context, and the statute’s structure is currently in vogue as it reduces
the extent to which judges, using their discretion, become the real “authors of
the rule.”45
Examining the plain language of the Federal Arbitration Act does not
explicitly answer the question of whether the limited review outlined in section
10(a) is the extent of allowable review under the FAA.  At first glance, section
10(a) would appear to give a federal court the power to vacate an award only
when the arbitrator’s actions jeopardize the procedural fairness of the arbitra-
tion.46  Yet the section does not require the court to vacate the award even
when these bases appear.  According to section 10(a), in any of the following
“cases,” i.e., where procedural irregularity has occurred, a federal court “may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party. . . .”  The
use of the word “may” suggests that the court’s action is not mandatory.
While section 10(a) is not particularly clear on this issue, FAA section 9
contains language supporting the argument that the statutory grounds articu-
lated in section 10(a) are exclusive.  According to section 9:  “[T]he court must
41 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 184-
85 (1994); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993); Sanchez v. Pac. Powder
Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[w]hen interpreting a statute, this
court looks first to the words that Congress used”); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Cov-
erage Under COBRA:  A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS. 195, 210 (1996)
(citing a variety of commentators, including Hart and Sacks, that state the starting point for
the court in matters of statutory interpretation is to give effect to congressional intent); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415
(1989) (writing that textualism, which looks to the statutory language as the source of judi-
cial power is “enjoying a renaissance in a number of recent cases”).  Textualism is not the
only approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 415-41.  Because it receives a certain general
acceptance among academics and courts, it will be applied to the FAA language.
42 Lutheran Hosp. of Ind., Inc. v. Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am., 51 F.3d 1308, 1312
(7th Cir. 1995); see also Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) (The “cardinal principle of statutory construction” requires
a court to give effect “to every clause and word of a statute.”).
43 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); see
also Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 1992).
44 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984); Cole, supra note 41, at 210.
45 Herrmann, 978 F.2d at 982.
46 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).  Thomas Carbonneau contends that
FAA § 10 does not contemplate review of arbitral awards on the merits.  Such a practice,
Carbonneau states, may “require the court to engage in a form of review that is otherwise
legally impermissible and contravenes the gravamen of the federal policy on arbitration.”
THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 220 (2d ed.
2000).
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grant such an order [confirming the award] unless the award is vacated, modi-
fied, or corrected as prescribed by sections 10 and 11 of this title.”  At least two
federal appellate courts interpreted this language to mean that Congress did not
want federal courts to conduct de novo review of arbitral awards on their mer-
its; rather, it “commanded that when the exceptions do not apply, a federal
court has no choice but to confirm.”47
The identification of only four bases for vacatur in the FAA, all of which
allow vacating an award only where procedural irregularities appear, also sug-
gests that the drafters of the FAA were concerned exclusively with ensuring the
procedural regularity of the arbitral decision-making process, rather than guar-
anteeing that the arbitral decision is correct on the merits.48  While the statutory
criteria outlined in section 10(a) appear to focus primarily on preventing inap-
propriate arbitrator conduct rather than on ensuring that the underlying decision
is correct, courts and commentators have offered broader readings of the
section.
For example, one commentator explained that it may be possible to use
section 10(a)(4) to challenge an arbitration award on the ground that the award
is inconsistent with mandatory law.49  Professor Stephen Ware articulated an
argument that section 10(a)(4), which permits reversal of arbitral awards
because the arbitrator exceeded his authority, authorizes courts to vacate
awards if the arbitrators exceed their powers because arbitrators “do not have
the power to decide disputes without applying mandatory law.”50  Ware
emphasized that there is a “substantial debate” about the extent to which the
FAA either requires or permits “courts to review arbitrators’ legal rulings.”51
Courts have not extended section 10(a)(4) to permit substantive review of an
arbitrator’s legal rulings; at the present time, 10(a)(4) has only been applied to
cases where the arbitrator has decided an issue not properly before her or where
she directed a remedy that was not within her power to order.  Thus, to this
47 UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998).  The UHC
court concluded that, in light of the FAA’s language, it is not clear that the Kyocera I deci-
sion was correct.  The court stated that “we do not believe it is yet a foregone conclusion that
parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court to cast aside sections 9, 10, and 11 of
the FAA.” Id.  The UHC court did not have to rule on the issue, however, because the
parties had not clearly stated that they wanted to depart from the statutory review standard.
Id. at 998.  In Kyocera II, the en banc Ninth Circuit concluded that FAA sections 9, 10, &
11, when considered together, permit very limited review of the underlying arbitration
award.  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc. (Kyocera II), 341 F.3d 987,
997-98 (9th Cir. 2003).
48 That may be because ensuring that arbitrators were correct on the law was the parties’
job.  According to one author, writing at the time the FAA was enacted, “[i]n all states, if the
parties provide in their arbitration agreement that the arbitrators must decide according to
law, the courts will hold the arbitrators to that agreement and will review their law on
appeal.”  Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47
HARV. L. REV. 590, 603 (1934).  The author concedes, however, that the parties’ language
must be explicit that the arbitrators should follow the law. Id. at 603-04.
49 See Ware, supra note 37, at 737.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 737-38.
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point, section 10(a)(4) has only peripherally applied to the merits of the under-
lying case.52
Professor Edward Brunet argued that the language in FAA section
10(a)(3) may contemplate a merit-based review of arbitral awards.53  Accord-
ing to Brunet, Congress may have intended section 10(a)(3) to allow reversal of
an arbitrator’s award when the arbitrator’s misbehavior prejudices or denies the
“rights” of any party.54  Under Brunet’s reading, section 10(a)(3) would allow
the court to reverse an arbitral award for an error of law that resulted in a denial
of rights.  While courts have never read section 10(a)(3) this broadly, as Brunet
acknowledged, it certainly raises the question whether the provision should be
more broadly construed.
Although the language of section 10(a), when read in the context provided
by section 9, would seem to establish that the FAA provides the exhaustive list
of reasons for reversal of an arbitral award, it is difficult to conclude confi-
dently that this is the case.  The analysis of the section suggests three possible
outcomes:  (1) that Congress intended to allow federal courts great freedom in
deciding whether and when to vacate an arbitral award; (2) that Congress
wanted to limit the bases for vacatur to those listed in section 10(a); or (3)
Congress did not contemplate parties requesting greater judicial review than
section 10(a) provides.  For the reasons following, the most likely explanation
is the third one.
Section 10(a) is not a significant departure from common law or state stat-
utory arbitration as it existed prior to the FAA’s passage.55  According to Pro-
fessor Ian MacNeil, the adoption of section 10 was, for practical reasons, an
unnecessary step as the existing common law already limited the bases upon
which a court could vacate an arbitral award.56  In fact, the 1921 draft of the
FAA did not include any provisions governing judicial review of arbitral
awards.57  This is not surprising because the 1921 draft mirrored the 1920 New
York arbitration law, which also failed to include any provisions dealing with
the process for reviewing awards.58
Thus, it would seem likely that the FAA drafters were simply attempting
to codify what they perceived to be the existing consensus regarding judicial
review of arbitral awards—that review should be limited to reversal on proce-
dural irregularity grounds.  It is quite probable that the drafters simply did not
52 Id.  While this is a much broader reading of the section than the courts have suggested is
appropriate, it raises the question whether section 10(a)(4) is subject to more than one con-
struction.  Brunet states that section 10(a)(4) may permit substantive review of an arbitration
award if the parties have agreed that, for example, the arbitrator should apply the substantive
law of a particular state.  Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 73 (1999).  According to Professor Brunet, mean-
ingful judicial review, when parties have agreed to it, is supported by section 10(a)(4). Id.
53 BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 4, at 411-12.
54 Id.
55 IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 103-04 (1992).  Although American courts’
and legislatures’ treatment of arbitral awards was not consistent, for the most part, courts and
legislatures provided only limited judicial review of arbitral awards even where the arbitrator
had ruled on issues of law.
56 Id. at 104.
57 Id. at 86.
58 Id.
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contemplate that parties would ever be interested in expanding judicial review
of arbitration awards.59  Nothing in the legislative history jeopardizes this
assumption.  In fact, the legislative history focuses almost entirely on the criti-
cal issue that the FAA was passed to address:  the enforceability of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.60  The Supreme Court’s examination of the FAA’s leg-
islative history supports the notion that Congress passed the FAA primarily in
order to ensure that parties’ pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate would be
enforced.61  The absence of discussion of judicial review in the legislative his-
tory suggests that the drafters intended to codify the common law, which lim-
ited review to examination of the arbitral award for procedural irregularities.62
Because the FAA’s language and its legislative history are inconclusive on
the issue of expanding statutory grounds for vacatur beyond the reasons articu-
lated in section 10(a), examination of the judicial treatment of the four bases for
vacatur listed in section 10(a) may help to eliminate the ambiguity.
Some appellate courts have held that section 10(a) establishes the exclu-
sive grounds for vacating commercial arbitration awards.63  Yet most other
appellate courts have vacated arbitral awards on grounds not articulated in sec-
tion 10(a).64  According to the latter courts, the acceptable nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur include that the award was in manifest disregard of the law,
completely irrational, in direct conflict with public policy, arbitrary and capri-
cious, or failed to draw its essence from the parties’ underlying contract.65
Courts have accepted the “manifest disregard of the law” standard for
vacatur more frequently than the other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of arbi-
59 Alternatively, the drafters may have believed that parties who wanted arbitrators to fol-
low the law would contract for that result.  At the time the FAA was enacted, courts rou-
tinely enforced such agreements.  Phillips, supra note 48, at 603 (citing numerous state
cases).
60 See MACNEIL, supra note 55, at 100-01.
61 See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 220 (1985) (ruling that agree-
ment to arbitrate is enforceable even when pleaded together with nonarbitrable claims in a
complaint).
62 But perhaps they believed that state law would deal with this issue. See Phillips, supra
note 48, at 603 (reporting that at the time Congress enacted the FAA, state courts reviewed
arbitration awards to ensure consistency with the law if parties explicitly requested such
review).
63 See R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1992); O.R. Sec.,
Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Brad A. Gal-
braith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court:  Contemplating the
Use and Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241, 248
n.53 (1993).
64 Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12
(2d Cir. 1997); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239 (1st Cir. 1995). But
see McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting any non-
statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards).
65 Five federal courts of appeals, the Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have
recognized one or more of these nonstatutory grounds for vacatur. See Hayford, supra note
8, at 463.  Five other federal courts of appeals, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, however, have stated their positions much less clearly. Id. at 463-64.  At times,
cases from the circuits indicate a desire to limit review to the statutory grounds, asserting
that section 10(a) establishes the “exclusive grounds” for vacating arbitration awards; at
other times, as Professor Hayford notes, each of these courts has issued decisions granting
vacatur on one of the nonstatutory vacatur grounds. Id.
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tral awards.66  This basis for appealing an arbitral award emerged from the
dictum of a 1953 Supreme Court decision, Wilko v. Swan.67  In Wilko, the
Court said:
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with
the provisions of the [applicable law] would “constitute grounds for vacating the
award pursuant to section 10[a] of the Federal Arbitration Act,” that failure would
need to be made clearly to appear.  In unrestricted submissions [to arbitration] . . . the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.68
Many appellate courts have construed Wilko as adding a nonstatutory ground to
the already existing grounds for vacatur listed in section 10(a).  This position is
controversial for several reasons.  First, the Wilko Court may not have intended
to add a “nonstatutory” ground to the existing grounds for vacatur.  The Court
stated that the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of existing law constitutes
“grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.”69  The Court may simply have been interpreting the statutory
grounds listed in section 10(a) to permit review of awards when an arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law, i.e., knew what the law was and ignored it.
Certainly, section 10(a)(4), allowing vacatur where the arbitrator exceeds his
powers, could fit within its purview situations where the arbitrator ignores
existing law.70  Other federal courts adopt this interpretation of Wilko, holding
that the “manifest disregard” standard is derived from, rather than independent
of, section 10(a).71
Moreover, the dictum establishing the “manifest disregard” standard may
not be good law.  At the time the Court decided Wilko, it was extremely suspi-
66 Id. at 465.  Only the Fourth Circuit has consistently rejected parties’ attempts to avoid
arbitral awards on nonstatutory grounds.  Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143 (4th
Cir. 1994).  When Congress enacted the FAA, the court stated, it intended to limit the
grounds for vacatur to the four listed in section 10(a) of the FAA. Id. at 146.  According to
the Remmey court, “[t]he statutory grounds for vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently
improper conduct in the course of the proceedings; they do not permit rejection of an arbitral
award based on disagreement with the particular result the arbitrators reached.” Id.  Both the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to adopt the “manifest disregard” standard,
although they have not expressly rejected it.  Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41
(11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750
(8th Cir. 1986).  Three circuits have criticized the standard.  Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon &
Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1990); I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Convert-
ers, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1974).
67 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
68 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
69 Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
70 Although the Court has mentioned the manifest disregard standard in three other opin-
ions, it has never clarified the relationship between the “manifest disregard” standard and
section 10.  Thus, it is open to interpretation as to the meaning underlying the Court’s dictum
in Wilko.  Other commentators raise the issue whether the Wilko dictum may have been
intended merely to “illustrate an instance which would fall within the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act’s provisions for vacating an arbitration award,” rather than creating an inde-
pendent statutory ground for vacatur.  Galbraith, supra note 63, at 257.
71 Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1988); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
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cious of arbitration as a means to resolve statutory claims.  The Court has long
since abandoned that suspicion and overruled Wilko on the ground that statu-
tory claims are appropriate subjects of arbitration.  In light of the changed judi-
cial attitude toward arbitration, one wonders whether the Supreme Court’s 1953
position that awards could be overturned for manifest disregard of the law
would still be the Court’s view today.72
Similar difficulties are apparent when the other nonstatutory grounds are
examined.  The remaining nonstatutory grounds are inconsistent with the plain
language of section 10(a) of the FAA because they contemplate a substantive
review of the underlying arbitral award.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has not
recognized any of these nonstatutory grounds as additional bases for vacating
arbitral awards.  Finally, unlike the “manifest disregard” standard, none of the
remaining nonstatutory grounds have reached any level of acceptance among
the federal appellate courts.  In light of this lack of consensus and inconsistency
with FAA intent, the remaining nonstatutory grounds do little to undermine the
argument that the FAA’s standards for judicial review are mandatory rules.
An examination of the FAA’s statutory language, its legislative history,
and subsequent judicial interpretation of its language does not clearly indicate
that the FAA’s review provisions are either mandatory or default rules.  As
courts and commentators have repeatedly suggested, section 10(a)’s language is
susceptible to more than one interpretation.  An interpretation that would per-
mit courts to grant parties’ requests for greater review of arbitral awards would
be consistent with a permissible interpretation of the language of section 10(a)
and the purpose underlying the FAA.  Although the opposite conclusion is also
an acceptable interpretation, given the importance of freedom of contract and
the presumption in favor of finding that the FAA creates default rules rather
than mandatory ones, a conclusion that the FAA authorizes courts to grant
party requests would seem the better result.
IV. REWRITING FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT SECTION 10
Although I recommend that courts find that the FAA creates default rules
around which parties may contract, a better solution would be for Congress to
reconsider the FAA’s judicial review provision and directly address the ques-
tion whether party agreements to expand judicial review of arbitration awards
are enforceable.  In Arbitration Law in America, Professor Ed Brunet offers a
proposed revision of section 10.  He would add a new section 10(a)(7) that
states, “Party Authority to Enhance Review:  The parties may contract for judi-
cial review of the arbitration award for reasons beyond the grounds set forth in
72 The U.S. Supreme Court may eventually answer this question but recently turned down
an opportunity to do so. See Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 434 (2006); see also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (The court stated that the Wilko “formula reflects precisely that
mistrust of arbitration for which the Court in its two Shearson/American opinions criticized
Wilko.  We can understand neither the need for the formula nor the role that it plays in
judicial review of arbitration [awards] (we suspect none—that it is just words).  If it is meant
to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire
modern law of arbitration.”).
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this act.”73  This simple statement seems to codify the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
Gateway.  Professor Brunet would empower parties to ask for any kind of judi-
cial review they wish.
Professor Ware’s solution is similar.  According to Professor Ware, party
agreements to expand judicial review of arbitration awards should be enforced
to “advance . . . the principle that arbitration agreements should be enforced”
just like any other contract.74  Thus, a revised FAA should tell courts to enforce
party agreements to expand judicial review as long as doing so would enforce
the agreement submitting the case to arbitration.75
I generally agree with Brunet and Ware that parties should be able to agree
to what they wish and that the FAA was written to ensure that arbitration agree-
ments are to be enforced like any other contract.  I part company from Profes-
sors Brunet and Ware, however, and side with Judge Kozinski because I
believe that there are some party requests that courts, as institutions, should not
be able to grant.  Thus, I propose a different provision that could be added to
section 10—parties should be able to expand judicial review, but only if that
review would not require the court to act in a way that damages the institutional
integrity of the court.  A new provision in FAA section 10 might read:
§ 10(a)(7)  The parties may contract for judicial review of the arbitration award for
reasons beyond the grounds set forth in this act provided that the reviewing court
finds that the parties’ agreement does not require the court to act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner in reviewing the underlying arbitration award.
The final section of this article will address the importance of the integrity
review and how it would work in the arbitration context.
V. WHEN DO PARTIES’ REQUESTS FOR EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRAL AWARDS THREATEN INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY?
Under this proposed language, courts cannot enforce party agreements that
threaten the institutional integrity of the court.  As we have seen, in cases like
Gateway, parties ask the courts to review arbitral awards utilizing standards
such as “errors of law.”  Citing party autonomy and freedom of contract, courts
often quickly approve the use of this standard and others, applying them to
review arbitral awards.  In so doing, the courts evaluating these requests have
virtually ignored the threat the use of such standards poses to institutional
integrity.76  Systematic application of an institutional integrity standard to par-
73 ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app. D, at 377.
74 Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration:  Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 88, 107.
75 Id. at 107-08.  Professor Ware’s proposed language states that a court shall vacate an
award where vacating the award “would enforce the agreement submitting the controversy to
arbitration.” ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app. A, at 349.
76 While the majority opinions in these cases reflect little concern for the courts’ integrity,
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence in Kyocera I suggests that, for him, concerns about the court’s
integrity are relevant to the discussion.  Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (Kyocera I),
130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring).  Kozinski’s comment that his
decision might be different if the parties had asked the court to “review the award by flipping
a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl,” shows a recognition that freedom of contract
must yield in those cases where the integrity of the courts as an institution is threatened. Id.
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ties’ requests would force courts to evaluate carefully whether adoption of the
parties’ proposed standard for reviewing the arbitral award would undermine
the court’s integrity.  Using an integrity review, a court could easily reject a
proposed standard that would require the court to review the underlying arbitral
award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.  Moreover,
application of such a standard would ensure that courts evaluate properly
requests that might appear, at first glance, not to threaten the court’s integrity.
In the arbitral context, as we have seen, courts have upheld parties’ request
for application of the “errors of law” or “unsupported by substantial evidence”
standards.  While these standards might not appear to threaten the court’s integ-
rity because courts review all kinds of decisions for legal errors and factual
insufficiency, they are nevertheless problematic because the standards prompt
the court to review the underlying award even in the absence of a record or
written opinion from the proceedings before the arbitrator.77  A court’s rubber
stamp of the underlying decision in the absence of a record when the parties’
chosen standard anticipates a more meaningful review may undermine institu-
tional integrity because it makes the court appear to be an unprincipled decision
maker.
When such a case presents itself, how might a court go about engaging in
an integrity review?  Perhaps an analogy to administrative law would be helpful
because courts routinely review administrative agencies’ informal adjudica-
tions.78  Like arbitrations, informal agency adjudications resolve disputes
between two parties.  When a court reviews an informal agency decision, it
considers whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary or capricious.  A deci-
sion is rejected as arbitrary and capricious if the agency offered an explanation
for its decision that contradicts the evidence that was before the agency at the
time of the decision or failed to supply a reasoned analysis supporting its deci-
sion.79  In other words, application of an arbitrary and capricious standard per-
forms the function of assuring sufficient factual support for a decision.80  By
applying the arbitrary and capricious rule, courts attempt to strike a balance
between excessive judicial intervention in agency decision making, on the one
hand, and abdication of traditional control over judicial power on the other.81
77 In modern arbitration, it is unusual for parties to maintain a record of their arbitral hearing
or for an arbitrator to write an opinion.  Thus, when the parties request judicial review of the
arbitral award, there is little for a court to review.  When a court reviewed arbitral awards for
procedural irregularities alone, the lack of a record or opinion was not viewed as problem-
atic.  As Stephen Hayford notes, commercial arbitrators rarely set forth the reasons underly-
ing their decisions in a written opinion.  Hayford, supra note 8, at 444-45.  Nevertheless,
courts have routinely applied the FAA’s four bases for vacatur. Id. at 452-53.
78 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(holding that in absence of reasoned analysis, change in agency policy rejected as arbitrary
and capricious); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971)
(stating that agency decision reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard).
79 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.  In the agency context, the court will also
consider whether the agency has relied on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider
or failed to consider factors that it should have considered. Id.
80 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
81 See Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the application of
the arbitrary and capricious rule to ERISA disputes strikes the appropriate balance between
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As in administrative law, application of an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard to evaluate party requests for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards
requires a court to ensure that it is capable of reviewing the underlying decision
using the standard the parties propose.  If a court is unable to apply the parties’
standard because there is no record to which it may apply the standard, the
court would reject the standard as requiring the court to engage in arbitrary and
capricious decision making and dismiss the case.82
Of course, adoption of “arbitrary and capricious” as the standard for
reviewing parties’ requests is not a panacea.  Unlike administrative law, where
the administrative agency is a party to the proceeding in front of the district
court and is therefore subject to the court’s orders, in arbitration, the court
cannot order the arbitrator to do anything because the arbitrator is not a party to
the enforcement action, only the parties to the arbitration are.  Because the
court has no power to order the arbitrator to do anything, the court has no
power to remand the case to the arbitrator for development of a record or draft-
ing of an opinion.
The answer, then, is for the court to reject the parties’ request for
expanded judicial review if the court would be required to engage in arbitrary
and capricious action.  Then the parties, if they choose, can commission the
arbitrator to write an opinion or, in their next agreement, agree to maintain a
record of the arbitral proceedings.83
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal Arbitration Act section 10, as it is currently configured, fails to
address a growing issue in the commercial marketplace—parties who wish to
have greater review of their arbitration award than the FAA provides.  The
raging debate about whether section 10 contains mandatory or default rules has
yet to be resolved.84  In fact, the federal circuit courts are evenly split on the
issue.  Although I believe a convincing case can be made that FAA section 10
the need for judicial control of fiduciaries’ actions with the need to avoid excessive judicial
intervention in the discharge of trustees’ discretionary duties).
82 In reviewing arbitral awards based on a standard the parties’ propose, courts would utilize
the arbitrary and capricious standard somewhat differently than would courts reviewing
agency decisions.  Rather than ensuring that the agency has not acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, in the case of arbitral award review, the court is ensuring that application of the
parties’ standard does not require the court to act arbitrarily and capriciously.  Despite this
difference, the administrative law analogy seems helpful in that, in both administrative law
and elsewhere, the court’s concern is to ensure that arbitrary and capricious decision making
is not tolerated.
83 Unlike early state habeas corpus cases where a state trial court’s failure to maintain a
record did not preclude substantive review, in the arbitral context, there is typically little in
the manner of pleadings or discovery to review.  Thus, a record or opinion requirement is
essential because, without such a requirement, the court would have nothing to which they
could apply the parties’ proposed standard of review.
84 Resolution may not be far off, however.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 196 F. App’x. 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
2875 (2007).  This case squarely presents the question whether parties may agree to expand
judicial review of an arbitration award on grounds other than those listed in the Federal
Arbitration Act.
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contains default rules that parties may contract around, perhaps a better solution
would be for Congress to overhaul the Federal Arbitration Act.  If Congress
were to take on this task, revision of section 10 to permit parties to expand
judicial review of arbitration awards would be a sensible change.  Although this
result promotes efficiency and party autonomy, in our constitutional system
efficiency should not be achieved at the expense of rights.  Thus, in evaluating
parties’ agreements to expand judicial review of arbitration awards, courts
should ask questions about the impact of expanded review on the institutional
integrity of the courts.  This Article proposes that Congress adopt an approach
that allows courts to root out those requests that might damage society’s per-
ception of the courts as principled decision makers.  Such an approach will
likely provide adequate protection for the courts’ status as an institution.
While adoption of this test is unlikely to change the outcome of many
court decisions, it would ensure the protection of the courts’ institutional integ-
rity through application of an arbitrary and capricious review.  Already utilized
routinely in administrative law to review agency decisions to ensure adequate
factual support, an arbitrary and capricious review would allow a court to reject
those party requests that might not initially appear to threaten the court’s integ-
rity but actually do, such as requests for intensive review of an underlying
decision where no record of the decision was kept.
This review process acknowledges that courts are not puppets that litigants
may manipulate as they wish.  Courts do and should continue to do what is
possible, given their limited authority, to grant party requests.  After all, free-
dom of contract is an essential precept in our judicial system.  Yet courts must
refrain from granting requests that they do not have authority to grant.  Moreo-
ver, courts must preserve their integrity as institutions by rejecting those
requests that would diminish their stature in the public’s eyes.
For arbitration, this means that parties’ requests for expanded review of
arbitral awards should be approved so long as they do not require arbitrary and
capricious decision making by the court.  While application of this test may
allow the errors of law standard to pass muster,85 any request that the court
review the arbitral award by a flip of a coin or by studying the entrails of a dead
fowl must be rejected.
85 The errors of law standard is only acceptable if the parties have also agreed that the
arbitrator would write an opinion explaining his factual findings and legal conclusions.
